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Abstract
We describe ongoing work in which we aim to formally specify a correctness condition for transactional
memory (TM) called Weakest Reasonable Condition (WRC ), and to facilitate fully formal and machine-
checked proofs that TM implementations satisfy the condition. To precisely deﬁne the WRC condition, we
express it using an I/O automaton. We similarly present another condition, called PRAG, which is more
restrictive, but more closely reﬂects intuition about common TM implementation techniques. We sketch a
simulation proof that PRAG implements WRC, allowing ourselves and others to focus more pragmatically
on proofs of such implementations. We are working on modeling these conditions in the PVS language
so that we can construct and check such proofs precisely and mechanically. We are also working towards
proving that some popular TM implementations satisfy the PRAG condition, starting with simple coarse-
grained versions and reﬁning them to model realistic implementations.
Keywords: Transactional memory, simulation, correctness condition, opacity, virtual worlds consistency.
1 Introduction
Transactional memory (TM) [9] aims to make it signiﬁcantly easier to develop and
maintain concurrent programs that are scalable, eﬃcient, and correct by allowing
programmers to specify that a sequence of operations on shared objects should
be executed as a transaction. A transaction makes the sequence of operations
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appear to be applied atomically (i.e., without interference from concurrent threads,
and without concurrent threads observing partial results of the sequence) without
specifying the synchronisation mechanism used to achieve such atomicity.
Because TM implementations aim to hide some of the complexity of concur-
rent programming in system software, it is important that they be correct. We
are therefore pursuing a long-term goal of developing formal and machine-checked
correctness proofs for TM implementations. We hope to follow an approach that
we have already used to verify a range of concurrent algorithms [2,3,5], specify-
ing both the permitted behaviour and the behaviour of the algorithm using I/O
automata (IOAs) [11], and using simulation proof techniques [12] to show that an
algorithm implements a given speciﬁcation. We construct these proofs using the
PVS veriﬁcation system [13], so our proofs can be entirely machine-checked.
In this paper, we describe foundational work we are doing to apply this approach
to formally verifying TM implementations. In particular, such veriﬁcation requires a
formal description of the legal behaviour of a TM implementation. In our previous
work, the algorithms implemented data structures with well-deﬁned, universally
accepted semantics, so specifying the permitted behaviours was straightforward. In
contrast, transactional memory, does not have universally accepted semantics, but
instead many variants. For now, we consider only the simple case in which variables
are not shared between transactional and nontransactional code.
Even in this case, there are subtleties: The semantics of committed transactions
are straightforward, but what guarantees are provided to transactions that abort?
It is important that they observe a consistent view of the memory up until the point
at which they abort [4]: a transaction that sees inconsistent state may take steps
that cause segmentation violations, etc. For example, a program may maintain an
invariant that two variables x and y are never equal, and then divide by x − y
within a transaction. If that transaction sees inconsistent state in which x and y
are equal, it will cause a divide-by-zero error. Although in some cases, it is possible
to “sandbox” transactions so that such errors can be hidden, this is not always
possible, especially in unmanaged languages such as C or C++.
In any case, our initial focus is on conditions that require all reads performed by
any transaction to be consistent. We provide formal descriptions of such conditions,
using IOAs to facilitate our approach to achieving formal, machine-checked correct-
ness proofs. Other researchers have speciﬁed TM correctness conditions that make
guarantees about the consistency of values read by aborted transactions [8,10], with
the same motivation. Our work diﬀers in the precise meaning of “consistent”, and in
the methods we use to express these conditions and prove that TM implementations
satisfy them. For example, some previous work on showing that implementations
satisfy such properties uses a combination of abstraction and model checking [6,7].
This approach is limited to implementations that share certain structural proper-
ties, and it is challenging to prove that an implementation has these properties.
Furthermore, the limitations of model checking necessitate concessions both in the
models and in the correctness conditions. Other related work [1] is closer in spirit
and approach to ours, but uses a correctness condition that is too strong to be used
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for many popular TM implementations.
In deﬁning a correctness condition for TM, we have several goals beyond provid-
ing an unambiguous and precise deﬁnition that supports formal machine-checkable
proofs: The condition must make suﬃcient semantic guarantees to be useful to pro-
grammers using TM. It should be easy to understand and reason about, so that
researchers and implementors can prove that TM implementations satisfy the con-
dition. And it should be as permissive as possible to avoid arbitrarily excluding
implementation techniques, including ones not yet invented.
There is tension between these goals: the generality of a highly permissive cor-
rectness condition makes the condition harder to understand, while admitting addi-
tional behaviours that are exhibited by few, if any, real implementations. We deal
with this tension by specifying multiple correctness conditions using IOAs, which
support hierarchical reasoning via simulation proofs [12], so that an automaton spec-
ifying a TM correctness condition can be used both as a speciﬁcation for a speciﬁc
TM implementation and as an implementation of a more permissive condition.
In this paper, we present two conditions: WRC—which stands for Weakest
Reasonable Condition—is very general and permissive. This name reﬂects our mo-
tivation and should not be overinterpreted, given that what is reasonable depends
to some extent on context. PRAG is more pragmatic: it is less general, less per-
missive, and closer to the intuition of how most existing TM runtimes work. We
sketch a proof that PRAG implements WRC. Thus researchers can prove that their
implementation implements PRAG, and conclude that it implements WRC.
In Section 2 we describe I/O automata, proof techniques, TM interfaces, and
notation used in the rest of the paper. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the WRC cor-
rectness condition and relate it to two previous conditions. We present the PRAG
condition in Section 5, and then sketch a simulation proof that it implies the WRC
condition in Section 6. We brieﬂy discuss our ongoing and future work in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
This section provides background on how we express TM correctness conditions,
how we model TM implementations, and how we prove relationships between them.
2.1 I/O automata
We use input/output automata (IOAs) [11] to express TM correctness conditions and
to model TM implementations. An IOA A is a labelled transition system that con-
sists of: a set states(A) of states; a nonempty set start(A) ⊆ states(A) of start states;
a set acts(A) of actions; a signature sig(A) = (external(A), internal(A)), which par-
titions acts(A); and a transition relation trans(A) ⊆ states(A)×acts(A)×states(A).
(We do not partition external(A) into input and output actions for this paper be-
cause we do not need to compose automata.) We describe a transition relation
using a precondition (a predicate on states) and an eﬀect (a set of assignments to
variables) for each action.
An execution fragment of A is a sequence s0, a1, s1, . . . of alternating states and
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actions of A, such that (sk−1, ak, sk) ∈ trans(A) for all k; a ﬁnite sequence must
end with a state. An execution is an execution fragment with s0 ∈ start(A). The
subsequence of external actions in an execution fragment is called its trace, and
represents its externally visible behaviour. The traces of an automaton A are the
traces of its executions; we denote the set of such traces by traces(A). For an
“abstract” automaton A, modelling a speciﬁcation, and a “concrete” automaton
C, modelling an implementation, C implements A iﬀ traces(C) ⊆ traces(A): every
behaviour of the implementation is allowed by the speciﬁcation.
2.2 Simulation proofs
One way to prove that C implements A is via a forward simulation [12], which
is a relation between states(C) and states(A) such that every start state of C is
related to some start state of A, and for every step (s, a, s′) ∈ trans(C) and every
u ∈ states(A) that is related to s by the forward simulation, there is an execution
fragment of A starting from u and ending in a state u′ such that (i) u′ and s′
are related by the forward simulation, and (ii) the execution fragment has the same
trace as the step of C. That is, if a is an internal action, then the execution fragment
has only internal actions, and if a is an external action, then the execution fragment
contains that action and no other external actions. With a forward simulation from
C to A, we can prove inductively that any trace of C is also a trace of A: given
an execution of C, we can construct an execution of A with the same trace by
choosing a start state of A related to the start state of C’s execution by the forward
simulation, and then for every step of C in turn, extending the execution of A with
the execution fragment required by the forward simulation. (Backward simulations
are also important for our work (see Section 7), but are not used in this paper.)
2.3 Objects and their sequential semantics
To state and prove properties of TM implementations that support general objects,
we need to formally deﬁne their interface and sequential semantics.
The interface for an object O consists of a set IO of possible invocations and a set
RO of possible responses. An invocation-response pair is an operation of the object.
The sequential semantics of an object O speciﬁes which sequences of operations
(i.e., elements of (IO ×RO)∗) are legal sequential histories.
Most TM implementations assume a speciﬁc type of object called a read-write
memory. For this reason, our PRAG automaton is specialised for a read-write
memory. A read-write memory maps a set L of locations to a set V of values. When
used by a set T of transactions, its interface is:
IRW = {invt(read(l)) | l ∈ L, t ∈ T } ∪ {invt(write(l, v)) | l ∈ L, v ∈ V, t ∈ T }
RRW = {respt(v) | v ∈ V, t ∈ T } ∪ {respt(ok), t ∈ T }
We model the state of a read-write memory as a function mem from L to V. We say
that a sequence ops of operations is legal starting from mem if it is a legal sequential
history of read-write memory where mem is the initial state, and we denote the state
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resulting from applying ops by mem/[wrSet], where wrSet is a partial function that
maps each location written in ops to the last value written to it in ops. (We use
L → V⊥ to denote the set of partial functions from L to V, where ⊥ indicates where
the function is not deﬁned.)
Given a set S ⊆ T , a serialisation of S is a sequence σ ∈ S∗ such that each
transaction in S occurs exactly once in σ. We denote the set of serialisations of S
by ser(S). For a serialisation σ of S and transaction t ∈ S, we denote the preﬁx of
σ up to and including t by σ|≤t. A serialisation is consistent with a partial order po
on S if po is contained in the order imposed by the serialisation; we denote the set
of such serialisations by ser(S, po) Two partial orders on S are consistent with each
other if there is a serialisation of S that is consistent with both. (We use “partial
order” to refer to any transitive and antisymmetric, but not necessarily reﬂexive,
binary relation.)
2.4 TM interfaces, correctness conditions, and models
We can model a TM system supporting object O using an automaton TM(O), with
external(TM(O)) = ITM(O) ∪RTM(O), where:
ITM(O) = IO ∪ {begint, committ, cancelt}
RTM(O) = RO ∪ {beginOkt, commitOkt, abortedt}
These actions, together with actions of internal(TM(O)), determine the behaviour
of a TM system modeled this way. In Sections 3 and 5, we use such models to
specify two notions of correct behaviour for a TM system. In our ongoing work, we
also use such automata to model TM implementations. We can then use simulation
proofs to prove that one correctness condition implements another (see Section 6 for
a sketch of one such proof), or that a TM implementation implements a condition.
In our proof work, we model the automata in formal detail using the PVS lan-
guage, and use the PVS theorem prover to construct and check our simulation
proofs. However, for clarity, we present the automata using more familiar mathe-
matical notation, and sketch the above-mentioned proof carefully but informally.
3 WRC : a weak correctness condition for TM
In this section, we present the WRC correctness condition for TM; we relate it
to previous conditions in the next section. We deﬁne WRC as the set of traces
exhibited by an I/O automaton. Expressing our conditions this way serves both
to make them unambiguous, and to facilitate the construction of precise, machine-
checked proofs about them, an important aspect of our work. WRC is deﬁned by the
automaton shown in Figure 1. The automaton should be mostly self-explanatory;
we discuss the most interesting and important details below.
Roughly, WRC requires that, for every execution, there is a total order over com-
mitted transactions that respects their real-time order and the sequential semantics
of the underlying objects. Thus, an implementation that satisﬁes WRC gives the
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appearance that each committed transaction takes eﬀect atomically at some point
during its execution. WRC further requires that a transaction that aborts observes
behaviour consistent with an execution in which the (partially executed) transac-
tion takes eﬀect atomically at some point after it begins; this execution must be
consistent with the real-time order of committed transactions. WRC allows:
• any transaction to “pretend” that some commit-pending transactions commit
even though they may ultimately abort (a transaction is commit-pending if it has
invoked commit, but has not yet committed or aborted);
• operations executed by any transaction to be “justiﬁed” by diﬀerent sets of other
transactions at diﬀerent times during its execution; and
• transactions that ultimately abort to see any set of committed transactions in
any order that could have existed at some point during its execution, even if this
is not consistent with the transactions that actually commit in the execution.
The ﬂexibility implied by this last point is acceptable because, as stated earlier,
the key requirement for an aborted transaction is that it does not observe behaviour
that could not have occurred during the interval of its execution: the user program
should correctly handle any behaviour that could occur, so it does not matter if
such a transaction observes behaviour that did not actually occur, because aborted
transactions have no observable side eﬀects.
The automaton achieves this permissive condition by requiring each successful
transaction to be justiﬁed by a sequence of transactions that includes itself and re-
spects the sequential semantics and the real-time order on transactions. The latter
requirement is enforced as follows: First, the automaton records which commit-
ted transactions precede each transaction (see the extOrder variable and the begint
action). Second, the sequence of transactions that justiﬁes a transaction commit-
ting successfully must include all of the committed transactions that precede it in
the real-time order, and the transaction itself (see the commitOkt action and the
validCommit predicate). It may also include any subset of the commit-pending
transactions. The ability to include any subset of commit-pending transactions
provides much of the ﬂexibility of the WRC condition.
It may seem that, when a transaction t2 commits successfully having chosen
an order in which a commit-pending transaction t1 precedes t2, this requires t1
to commit successfully and to be ordered before t2. In fact, this is not the case.
Rather, the automaton requires that, no matter what happens in the future, the
successful commit of t2 will always be justiﬁed. This may be by having t1 commit
successfully, but it could also be that t2’s successful commit is justiﬁed by another
transaction t3 by the time t1 fails. This is illustrated by the following example. In
this and all other example executions in the paper, we assume a read/write memory
whose values are all zero initially. Apart from commit operations, all invocations
are followed immediately by a corresponding response. B1 denotes begin1/beginOk1,
C1 denotes commit1, OK1 denotes commitOk1, A1 denotes aborted1, W1x1 denotes
inv1(write(x, 1))/resp1(ok), and R1x1 denotes inv1(read(x))/resp1(1).
B1 W1x1 C1 B2 R2x1 B3 W3x1 C2 C3 A1 OK2 OK3
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State variables
extOrder : binary relation on T ; initially empty
For each t ∈ T :
statust: {notStarted, beginPending, active, opPending, commitPending,
cancelPending, committed, aborted}; initially notStarted
opst: sequence of operations (i.e., an element of (I ×R)∗); initially empty
pendingOpt: I; initially arbitrary
snapshotst: set of subsets of T ; initially empty
Actions
begint
Pre: statust = notStarted
Eﬀ: statust ← beginPending
extOrder← extOrder ∪ (CT× {t})
beginOkt
Pre: statust = beginPending
Eﬀ: statust ← active
invt(op)
Pre: statust = active
Eﬀ: statust ← opPending
pendingOpt ← op
respt(r)
Pre: statust = opPending
validResp(t, pendingOpt, r)
Eﬀ: statust ← active
opst ← opst ◦ (pendingOpt, r)
committ
Pre: statust = active
Eﬀ: statust ← commitPending
commitOkt
Pre: statust = commitPending
validCommit(t)
Eﬀ: statust ← committed
cancelt
Pre: statust = active
Eﬀ: statust ← cancelPending
abortedt
Pre: statust ∈ {beginPending, opPending,
commitPending, cancelPending}
statust = commitPending =⇒ validFail(t)
Eﬀ: statust ← abortedsnapt
Pre: statust ∈ {beginPending, active, opPending}
Eﬀ: snapshotst ← snapshotst ∪ {CPT ∪ CT}
Derived state variables, functions and predicates
ops(σ)  opsσ0 ◦ opsσ1 ◦ . . . ◦ opsσnwhere σ is a sequence of transactions, and n = |σ| − 1
CT  {t | statust ∈ {committed}}
CPT  {t | statust ∈ {commitPending}}
validCommit(t)  ∃S ⊆ CPT,∃σ ∈ ser(CT ∪ S, extOrder), t ∈ S and ops(σ) is a legal sequential history
validFail(t)  ∃S ⊆ CPT,∃σ ∈ ser(CT ∪ S, extOrder), t /∈ S and ops(σ) is a legal sequential history
validResp(t, op, r)  ∃S ∈ snapshotst,∃σ ∈ ser(S ∪ {t}, extOrder), ops(σ|≤t) ◦ (op, r) is a sequential legal
history
Fig. 1. The automaton used to deﬁne the WRC correctness condition for TM.
This observation leads to a rather surprising requirement for aborting transac-
tions to have a nontrivial validation condition; in most models, any attempt to
commit a transaction may fail. This validation condition (see abortedt action and
validFail predicate) is identical to the one for successful commit (discussed above),
except that the failing transaction is not included in the order. In other words,
before failing, a transaction must conﬁrm that all of the transactions that have
already decided to commit can be justiﬁed without committing that transaction.
Next, we explain how the automaton ensures that the sequence of operations
executed by a transaction is always consistent with an execution that could have
happened. The key idea is essentially the same as the way we validate that a
transaction can commit safely. The key diﬀerence is that we wish to allow for the
operations of a transaction to be considered by that transaction to be applied at
any time during its execution. This provides additional ﬂexibility over the commit
validation condition, because it allows the transaction to “go back in time” to any
point during its execution and pretend that some concurrent transactions that were
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previously commit-pending but have now committed had not committed.
To facilitate this, the internal snapt action, which is enabled at any time after
a transaction begins and before its committ action, takes a snapshot of the set of
transactions that are either committed or commit-pending when the action occurs.
This allows the transaction to use the point at which such a snapshot was taken to
justify its sequence of operations so far. Note that, just as the successful committing
of a transaction may be justiﬁed by diﬀerent sequences of transactions at diﬀerent
times (explained above), diﬀerent snapshots may be used to justify the operations
of a transaction at diﬀerent times.
Finally, we observe that the sequence of transactions that justiﬁes successfully
committing a transaction imposes no constraints on transactions that abort. Fur-
thermore, the sequences of transactions that justify the operations executed by an
uncommitted transaction, as well as aborting a transaction, impose no constraints
on other incomplete or aborted transactions. Thus, they need not agree on which
transactions commit or in which order. As we will see in the next section, this is
the key diﬀerence between WRC and the previously proposed opacity condition.
4 Previous correctness conditions
In this section, we discuss two correctness conditions—opacity [8] and virtual worlds
consistency (VWC) [10]—that have been proposed previously for similar contexts
and with similar motivation. That is, these proposals suggest correctness conditions
for TM runtime interfaces which ensure that even transactions that ultimately abort
observe only consistent memory states before they abort. Both proposals illustrate
important points about what behaviours should and should not be allowed to be
exhibited by a TM implementation, but both have shortcomings too.
We were working towards our WRC condition to overcome what we saw as
shortcomings of opacity (see below) before we became aware of VWC. At ﬁrst we
thought that our condition would be strictly weaker than both opacity and VWC.
However, as it turns out, WRC excludes behaviours exhibited by both opacity and
VWC, while capturing the best features of both. We explain below.
4.1 Opacity
Opacity [8] is the ﬁrst attempt to formally deﬁne a correctness condition that re-
quires all transactions (even aborting ones) to observe consistent behaviour, as WRC
does. Opacity is expressed in terms of similar interface and assumptions as we use
in this paper, although we use an explicit begint action for transactions, which is
not used in [8]. This appears to be a mostly cosmetic diﬀerence.
The most substantive diﬀerence between WRC and opacity is that WRC allows
diﬀerent aborted transactions to disagree on which other transactions commit, and
in what order. Thus, unless a programmer violates rules (which are often enforced
by the compiler) prohibiting “leaking” information out of aborted transactions,
opacity precludes implementations that programmers could not distinguish from
one that satisﬁes opacity.
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Finally, an interesting subtlety of opacity is that it is not preﬁx-closed. For
example, a read executed by one transaction may not be justiﬁed until later when
another transaction writes the value it read. In this case, the preﬁx of the execution
up to the read does not satisfy opacity, whereas later, when the write has occurred
in a transaction that has invoked its commit operation, it can.
The authors of [8] address this concern by imposing an additional requirement
that, at all times, the execution produced so far by the implementation satisﬁes
opacity. By specifying our correctness condition as the set of traces that can be
exhibited by an I/O automaton, we ensure a priori that the condition is preﬁx-closed
(because an automaton cannot produce an execution without ﬁrst producing all of
its preﬁxes). Furthermore our approach facilitates the construction of hierarchical
proofs that are suﬃciently precise to be machine-checked.
4.2 Virtual Worlds Consistency
Both VWC and WRC relax opacity’s requirement to justify all committed and
aborted transactions using a single order, simply requiring that aborted ones never
observe behaviour that could not have occurred. This point is illustrated by the
following example: B1 R1x0 B2 W2x2 C2 OK2 B3 R3x2 R3y0 W1y1 C1 OK1
This execution is not opaque because the only order for the committed trans-
actions is t1t2, while t3 observes that t2 has committed but not t1. The execution
does satisfy WRC, because the operations of t3 are consistent with behaviour that
could have occurred, namely t1 might have aborted. VWC similarly allows aborted
transactions to disagree with the set of committed transactions and/or their order.
We agree that opacity’s requirements on aborted transactions are too strong,
but as we explain below, we believe that VWC relaxes them too much. Therefore,
WRC excludes some behaviours that VWC allows.
The interfaces and assumptions used to deﬁne VWC diﬀer in several ways from
those of WRC and opacity, which leads to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in what conditions
can be expressed, and what executions are allowed. VWC is deﬁned only for the
limited case of a read-write memory in which no two writes ever write the same
value. Furthermore, unlike the interfaces of opacity and WRC, VWC does not model
transaction commit as an interval with an invocation and a response, which prevents
it from allowing the ﬂexibility of opacity and of WRC to allow executions in which a
read is justiﬁed by a write of a transaction that ultimately does not commit. Finally,
VWC allows aborted transactions to ignore committed transactions that precede
them in real time. This appears to derive from an assumption that transactions are
the only means of communication, which we do not assume.
In summary, WRC includes the best features of both opacity and VWC, while
excluding executions allowed by each of them. It is interesting to note, moreover,
that WRC allows executions that are allowed by neither opacity nor VWC, as shown
by the following example:
B1 R1x0 B2 W2x2 C2 B3 OK2 B4 R4x2 R4y0 R3x0 W3z3 C3 R4z3 W1y1 C1 OK1 A3 C4 A4
In this example, the only valid order of committed transactions is t1t2, so the
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only states are (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), and (2, 1, 0). But t4 sees (2, 0, 3) so the
execution is not opaque. Furthermore, because no committed transaction writes 3 to
z, this also shows that this execution is not VWC. However, all reads of all aborted
transactions can be justiﬁed under WRC. The only nontrivial one is t4’s read of z.
t4 can take a snapshot right after C3 that includes t1, t2, and t3. The following
order satisﬁes validResp using that snapshot: t2t3t4t1 (note that the serialisation
is required to be valid only up to and including t4). That order justiﬁes t4 seeing
(2, 0, 3).
5 PRAG: a stricter, more pragmatic condition
In this section, we introduce the PRAG automaton (Figure 2), which deﬁnes a
stricter TM condition than WRC that is closer to the intuition about the structure
of many TM implementations. In Section 6, we sketch a proof that every trace of
PRAG is also a trace of WRC. Thus, to prove that an implementation satisﬁes the
WRC condition, it suﬃces to prove that it satisﬁes the PRAG condition.
Like most TM implementations, PRAG supports a read-write memory, not the
general object semantics supported by WRC. In most TM implementations, for
each successful writing transaction, there is a distinct point between its commit
invocation and its response at which the transaction takes eﬀect. However, some
algorithms—such as TL2 [4]—allow read-only transactions to take eﬀect at some
point before they invoke commit. Furthermore, an active transaction must always
have a point during its execution at which the memory contains the values observed
thus far by the transaction. We explain how these properties are captured by the
PRAG automaton below. (We ignore for now the history variables of PRAG, which
are used only for the proof in the next section that PRAG implements WRC.)
The PRAG automaton records the sequence of states produced by successful
writing transactions, adding a new state at the end of the sequence whenever such
a transaction commits successfully; see the doCommitWritert action. (The sequence
is indexed from 0, so that states0 is the initial state of the memory, and statesk
is the state written by the kth writing transaction; we use stateslast to denote
the last element of states). The reads of a successful writing transaction must
be consistent with the last state in the sequence before its state is appended (see
the doCommitWritert action and the readCons predicate). Because the state is
always appended during the commit interval of a transaction (see the committ,
doCommitWritert, and commitOkt actions), successful writing transactions can be
ordered in a sequence that is consistent with the real-time order of transactions and
with the sequential semantics.
It remains to describe how PRAG allows a transaction to justify its reads by
any state that existed during its execution, including committing a read-only trans-
action. Observe that the automaton records the length of the sequence of states
when a transaction begins (see the begint action). Reads executed during a trans-
action (see the doReadt action), as well as entire read-only transactions (see the
doCommitReadOnlyt action), must be justiﬁed by that state or a subsequent state,
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State variables
states: sequence of functions mapping L to V;
initially a singleton mapping all locations to 0
For each t ∈ T :
pct: PCvals; initially notStarted
beginIdxt: N; initially arbitrary
rdSett: L→ V⊥; initially all ⊥
wrSett: L→ V⊥; initially all ⊥
Auxiliary history variables
extOrder : binary relation on T ; initially empty
For each t ∈ T :
opst: sequence of operations (i.e., (I ×R)∗);
initially empty
pendingOpt: I; initially arbitrary
commitIdxt: N; initially arbitrary
snapshotst: set of subsets of T ; initially empty
Actions
begint
Pre: pct = notStarted
Eﬀ: pct ← beginPending
beginIdxt ← |states| − 1
extOrder← extOrder ∪ (CT× {t})
beginOkt
Pre: pct = beginPending
Eﬀ: pct ← active
invt(read(l))
Pre: pct = active
Eﬀ: pct ← doRead(l)
pendingOpt ← read(l)
respt(v)
Pre: pct = readResp(v)
Eﬀ: pct ← active
opst ← opst ◦ (read(l), v)
snapshotst ← snapshotst ∪ {CPT ∪ CT }
invt(write(l, v))
Pre: pct = active
Eﬀ: pct ← doWrite(l, v)
pendingOpt ← write(l, v)
respt(ok)
Pre: pct = writeRespOk
Eﬀ: pct ← active
opst ← opst ◦ (write(l, v), ok)
snapshotst ← snapshotst ∪ {CPT ∪ CT }
committ
Pre: pct = active
Eﬀ: if dom(wrSett) is empty then
pct ← doCommitReadOnly
else
pct ← doCommitWriter
commitOkt
Pre: pct = commitRespOk
Eﬀ: pct ← committed
cancelt
Pre: pct = active
Eﬀ: pct ← cancelPending
abortedt
Pre: pct /∈ {notStarted, active, commitRespOk,
committed, aborted}
Eﬀ: pct ← aborted
doCommitReadOnlyt(n)
Pre: pct = doCommitReadOnly
validIdx(t, n)
Eﬀ: pct ← commitRespOk
commitIdxt ← n
doCommitWritert
Pre: pct = doCommitWriter
readCons(stateslast, rdSett)
Eﬀ: pct ← commitRespOk
commitIdxt ← |states|
states← states ◦ stateslast/[wrSett ]
doReadt(l, n)
Pre: pct = doRead(l)
l ∈ dom(wrSett) ∨ validIdx(t, n)
Eﬀ: if l ∈ dom(wrSett) then
pct ← readResp(wrSett(l))
else
v← statesn(l)
pct ← readResp(v)
rdSett ← rdSett/[l→ v ]
doWritet(l, v)
Pre: pct = doWrite(l, v)
Eﬀ: pct ← writeRespOk
wrSett ← wrSett/[l→ v ]
Functions and predicates
readCons(mem, rdSet)  ∀l ∈ dom(rdSet), rdSett(l) = mem(l)
validIdx(t, n)  beginIdxt ≤ n < |states| ∧ readCons(statesn, rdSett)
Fig. 2. The automaton used to deﬁne the PRAG correctness condition for TM. We use PCvals as shorthand
for the set of all values assigned to pc variables.
that is, a state that existed during the execution of the transaction.
PRAG is similar to opacity in that it disallows many executions that would be
acceptable for TM in order to achieve a simpler condition that is likely to suﬃce for
a large class of practical implementations. To more precisely characterise the rela-
tionship between the two conditions (again, modulo cosmetic interface diﬀerences),
we ﬁrst observe that opacity allows some executions that PRAG does not. This is
illustrated by the following example: B1 R1x0 W1x1 C1 B2 OK1 R2x0 W2y1 C2 OK2
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Because t2 reads 0 from x, t2 must be ordered before t1, which opacity allows.
However, the PRAG automaton must commit t1 before OK1, and therefore before t2
invokes commit. Thus, when t2 executes its doCommitWriter action, its validation
will fail, as its read set is not consistent with the last state installed by t1. Thus,
PRAG does not allow this execution.
We believe that every execution allowed by PRAG is also allowed by opacity, but
we have not formally proved this. It may be interesting or useful to express opacity
(restricted to executions whose preﬁxes all satisfy opacity, of course) as an automa-
ton, and to formally prove these relationships. However, we are more interested in
identifying conditions that are useful in practice than in precise characterisations of
relationships to previous conditions.
6 PRAG implements WRC
Here we sketch a proof that PRAG implements WRC ; we are working on construct-
ing this proof formally using the PVS theorem prover system. We ﬁrst describe the
key ideas in the proof, and then present formal invariants that support it.
Recall that WRC imposes two conditions on an execution:
• There is a serialisation of all the committed transactions and some subset of
commit-pending transactions that is consistent with their real-time order, such
that applying the transactions according to that serialisation results in a legal
sequential history.
• For any transaction t (including active and aborted transactions), there is a seri-
alisation of t, together with all committed and some commit-pending transactions
at some point during t’s execution, that is consistent with real-time order such
that applying the transactions according to that serialisation up to t results in a
legal sequential history.
WRC does not require the serialisations of the second condition to be consis-
tent with each other or with the serialisation of the ﬁrst condition—indeed, even
which commit-pending transactions are included in the serialisation may vary from
transaction to transaction. However, PRAG is more restrictive: a transaction can
see values written by another transaction only if the other transaction is eﬀectively
committed, that is, it has executed its doCommit action. We denote the set of such
transactions by
ECT = {t | pct ∈ {commitRespOk, committed}}
Furthermore, PRAG guarantees that, at any time, there is a serialisation of all
transactions that is consistent with their real-time order, and that satisﬁes both the
ﬁrst condition when restricted to transactions in ECT, and the second condition for
any transaction t when restricted to transactions in ECT ∪ {t}.
We use a simple kind of forward simulation proof in which, for each state of
PRAG, there is a single state of WRC that is related to it by the simulation relation.
That is, the simulation relation is a reﬁnement mapping. To facilitate this, we
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f maps states of PRAG to states of WRC such that for any state s of PRAG,
f (s).extOrder = s.extOrder
and for all t ∈ T ,
f (s).statust =
8><
>:
opPending if s.pct ∈ {doRead(l) | l ∈ L} ∪ {readResp(v) | v ∈ V}
∪ {doWrite(l, v) | l ∈ L ∧ v ∈ V} ∪ {writeRespOk}
commitPending if s.pct ∈ {doCommitReadOnly, doCommitWriter, commitRespOk}
s.pct otherwise
f (s).opst = s.opst
f (s).pendingOpt = s.pendingOpt
f (s).snapshotst = s.snapshotst
Fig. 3. A reﬁnement mapping from PRAG to WRC.
augment PRAG with history variables (shown in Figure 2): The extOrder, opst,
pendingOpt, commitIdxt and snapshotst variables simply maintain the corresponding
state variables from WRC. The only nontrivial aspect to adding these variables is
determining when to update snapshotst, which is explained below. The reﬁnement
mapping from PRAG to WRC is shown in Figure 3.
We now describe the proof. The correspondence between initial states is im-
mediate. For the inductive part of the proof, the choice of WRC action(s) for a
given action of PRAG is fairly straightforward. For an internal action, the prestate
and the poststate of PRAG map to the same state of WRC, so no step is taken
by WRC. For external actions other than respt(v) and respt(ok), we take the same
action in WRC. For respt(v) and respt(ok), we choose a snapt action followed by
the respt action itself. (Although PRAG does not exploit the ﬂexibility aﬀorded by
having a separate snapt action, we need a snapshot to satisfy the preconditions of
the respt action, so we take one immediately before such actions.)
In most cases, the justiﬁcation for the choice of action(s) follows directly from
the prestate implied by the reﬁnement mapping. However, for resp, commitOk and
aborted, we must show that the appropriate validation condition holds. To facilitate
this, we add the commitIdxt history variable; proving properties about this variable
entails most of the complexity of the proof.
For t ∈ ECT, the commitIdxt variable maintains an index into states indicating a
state that t either wrote (if t is a writing transaction) or against which it validated
its read set (if it is read-only) in its doCommit action. Thus, that state can be
thought of as the state of the memory immediately after the transaction. These
“commit indices” deﬁne a partial order on eﬀectively committed transactions that
is consistent with extOrder (see Invariant 6). Furthermore, there is a bijection
between states in states after the initial state and eﬀectively committed writing
transactions (see Invariant 5), so this order is total on these transactions.
Two key observations are: a) applying the eﬀectively committed transactions
according to any serialisation consistent with the commit-index order yields a legal
sequential history (see Invariant 11); and b) every transaction t that has started
but not eﬀectively committed can be inserted into this serialisation at some point
consistent with extOrder, such that applying the transactions in the preﬁx of this
serialisation ending in t is also a legal sequential history (see Invariant 12).
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That the validation conditions hold for commitOkt and abortedt follows from
observation a) above. Because the commit-index order is consistent with extOrder,
there is some serialisation that is consistent with both orders. Furthermore, because
a transaction executing the commitOk action is in ECT, and one executing the
aborted action is not in ECT, such a serialisation satisﬁes the appropriate validation
condition for each of these actions.
Finally, we must also verify that the validation condition of the respt action is
satisﬁed. This follows from observation b) above, using the snapshot just taken by
the previous action (which includes all transactions in ECT).
We now present invariants of PRAG that are used in the proof. The following
ones are easy to verify by induction:
Invariant 1 If pct = notStarted then rdSett(l) = wrSett(l) = ⊥ for all l ∈ L.
Invariant 2 For t ∈ T :
• If pct = notStarted then beginIdxt < |states|.
• If t ∈ ECT then beginIdxt ≤ commitIdxt < |states|.
Invariant 3 For t ∈ T :
• If pct = doCommitReadOnly then dom(wrSett) = ∅.
• If pct = doCommitWriter then dom(wrSett) = ∅.
Invariant 4 says that if two transactions are ordered by extOrder, then the ﬁrst
transaction is eﬀectively committed, the second transaction has started, and the
begin index of the second transaction is no earlier than the commit index of the ﬁrst.
Furthermore, if the second transaction is eﬀectively committed, then its commit
index is no earlier than the commit index of the ﬁrst, and is strictly later if the
second transaction is a writing transaction.
Invariant 4 If (t, t′) ∈ extOrder, then:
• t ∈ ECT
• pct′ = notStarted
• commitIdxt ≤ beginIdxt′
• t′ ∈ ECT =⇒ commitIdxt ≤ commitIdxt′
• t′ ∈ ECT ∧ dom(wrSett′) = ∅ =⇒ commitIdxt < commitIdxt′
Invariant 5 says that for every state in states except for the initial state, there
is a unique transaction that writes the memory to produce that state. It is the ﬁrst
transaction that has that commit index.
Invariant 5 If 0 < n < |states| then, for exactly one t ∈ ECT, commitIdxt = n
and dom(wrSett) = ∅.
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We denote the partial order on ECT deﬁned by the commit indices by
commitIdxOrder = {(t, t′)|commitIdxt < commitIdxt′
∨ (commitIdxt = commitIdxt′ ∧ dom(wrSett) = ∅)}
Note that a writing transaction is ordered before any other transaction with the
same commit index. This is a partial order on ECT because of Invariant 5, and it
follows from Invariant 4 that this order is consistent with extOrder.
Invariant 6 commitIdxOrder is consistent with extOrder.
We now state several invariants about the operations done by transactions. To
do so, we deﬁne the sequence of operations done by transaction t:
ops′t =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
opst ◦ (pendingOpt, v) if pct = readResp(v)
opst ◦ (pendingOpt, ok) if pct = writeRespOk
opst otherwise
Invariant 7 says that for every transaction, there is some state that was current
at some time after the transaction began and is consistent with the transaction’s
read set. This holds because whenever a location is added to a read set (i.e., in one
case of the doRead action), it is associated with the value of the location in some
state that is already consistent with the transaction’s read set.
Invariant 7 If pct = notStarted then validIdx(t, n) for some n.
Invariant 8 says that a location is in the write set of a transaction t if and only
if t has written that location, in which case, it stores the last value so written. This
holds because whenever a transaction writes a location (doWrite action), it adds the
location to its write set, associating it with the value written.
Invariant 8 l ∈ dom(wrSett) if and only if ops′t contains (write(l, v), ok) for some
v ∈ V. Furthermore, if there is such an operation in ops′t then the last one has
v = wrSett(l).
Invariant 9 says that applying the operations of a transaction starting from
any state that is consistent with the transaction’s read set yields the appropriate
responses, and leaves the memory so that the locations in the transaction’s write set
have the values speciﬁed by the write set and all other locations are unchanged. It
follows straightforwardly by induction because a read operation gets the last value
written to that location (by Invariant 8), or the value in the state from which the
transaction starts if the location is not written by the transaction.
Invariant 9 If readCons(mem, rdSett) then ops′t is legal starting from mem and the
state resulting from applying ops′t is mem/[wrSett].
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We now come to the key invariants used to prove that PRAG implements WRC.
Invariant 10 says that for any eﬀectively committed transaction t ∈ ECT, applying
the operations of the eﬀectively committed transactions up to and including t in
any order consistent with the commit-index order yields the appropriate responses
and leaves the memory in the state corresponding to the commit index of t. This
invariant follows by induction, using Invariant 9 to show that it is preserved by
doCommit actions. Invariants 11 and 12 make observations a) and b) above precise.
Invariant 11 is just a special case of Invariant 10, while Invariant 12 follows from
Invariants 9 and 10.
Invariant 10 If σ ∈ ser(ECT, commitIdxOrder) then for every t ∈ ECT, ops(σ|≤t)
is a legal sequential history, and applying it to the initial state of the memory leaves
the memory in state statesn, where n = commitIdxt.
Invariant 11 If σ ∈ ser(ECT, commitIdxOrder) then ops(σ) is a legal sequential
history.
Invariant 12 If pct = notStarted, validIdx(t, n), S = {t′ ∈ ECT | commitIdxt′ ≤ n}
and σ ∈ ser(S, commitIdxOrder) then ops(σ) ◦ ops′t is a legal sequential history.
7 Ongoing and future work
We have introduced a general TM correctness condition WRC, and a more restric-
tive but more intuitive condition PRAG. We are working on constructing formal,
machine-checked proofs that PRAG implements WRC, as sketched in the previous
section, and that some TM implementations implement PRAG.
We are starting with a simple version of the popular TL2 TM algorithm [4].
This simple version, called TL2-CG, uses coarser-grained synchronisation than is
consistent with current multiprocessor architectures, but allows us to illustrate some
key ideas in our approach. Future work includes reﬁning TL2-CG to successively
more realistic implementations, ultimately proving a realistic model of the TL2
implementation correct. We aim to make it easy to reuse parts of the proof, for
example to prove variants on the algorithm, of which there are many.
One important aspect of our work is to eliminate the need to prove backward
simulations [12], which are particularly challenging, and are necessary for many
TM implementations. To this end, as in our previous work [3,5], we plan to identify
one or more general intermediate automata that we can prove (using backward
simulation proofs) implement PRAG. The idea is that we and others can then
prove the correctness of a TM implementation by proving that it implements one
of these intermediate automata using only forward simulation.
There are numerous aspects of TM models and implementations that our work
does not yet address, including nontransactional memory accesses, nesting, privati-
sation and publication idioms, progress properties, and notions of dangerous vs. safe
code, which relax consistency requirements for code that is known (or constructed)
to be safe even if the transaction executing it observes inconsistent behaviour.
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